9 March 2026
If you are covering the price of oil going over $100 dollars a barrel, please see the following comment from Lindsay James, investment strategist at Quilter:
“Attacks on Iranian oil facilities risk adding fresh tension to an already tight global energy market. Iran accounts for roughly 4% of global oil supply, and around 90% of its exports are directed to China. Beijing has built a sizeable strategic oil reserve, widely estimated to cover more than three months of consumption, which provides a buffer in the short term. But China remains the world’s largest crude importer and still sources more than half of its oil from the Middle East. While the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would be a far more significant shock for China, any sustained damage to Iran’s productive capacity would eventually be felt.
“There are also implications for Iran’s own post‑war economic prospects. Oil production represents about a quarter of Iranian GDP, so even temporary disruptions to export infrastructure complicate any future recovery. For now, the strikes appear to have focused on storage and distribution facilities rather than the oil fields themselves, limiting the immediate impact on global supply.
“Iran’s decision to target key infrastructure in the UAE is unsurprising. The intention is to raise the perceived cost of continued confrontation for the US and Israel. From Tehran’s perspective, any peace arrangement reached now would carry the risk of further strikes down the line. By widening the scope of retaliation, explicitly threatening supply chains, energy assets, and other Western‑linked infrastructure, Iran is attempting to deter future attacks by increasing the economic stakes.
“Despite US claims to have neutralised much of Iran’s naval capability, at least nine tankers have been struck in the Gulf. The message is clear that international shipping remains a valid target and the Strait of Hormuz are effectively closed. That alone is enough to unsettle markets, which had been pricing in a relatively swift resolution to the conflict. Such early optimism is common at the outset of geopolitical crises, but the timeline is no longer something Washington can shape.”
